This paper presents a compositional escape analysis (EA) adapted for use in resource limited embedded systems. It covers the full Java language, including dynamic class loading. Thanks to the use of an efficient verification algorithm, small embedded systems are able to check the EA information of mobile code. The traditional EA is also extended, taking further steps towards full Java programming support, by adding the support of common design patterns, namely aggregation and factory, in order to allow the use of coding techniques that are usually somewhat inefficient on these constrained systems.
Introduction
Escape analysis (EA) is a technique that has been originally developed for functional languages (e.g. [9] ) to help managing the allocation of structures. It has been transposed under various forms into object-oriented languages in many works [1, 2, 7, 12] . The principle behind EA is to compute that an object is captured (it cannot be used later) at a certain point of the program. Thus the object can be safely destroyed. Using this property improves memory management, e.g. by saving a lot of work for the garbage collector since it reduces the amount of references to be checked, and also the number of collections. Also, concurrent threads cannot access objects that do not escape and thus synchronization mechanisms can be eliminated. All these optimizations have been shown to improve performance [3, 12] .
In this paper, we present an application of EA in the context of embedded systems and mobile code, that takes the Java language as a basis since it is heavily used in this context. One of the most usual problem with Java in constrained environments is its weight: * funded by Mosaïques, CPER TAC 2005 -2008 traditionally, embedded systems rather use simplified versions of Java (like JavaCard), which imposes an adaptation of the programmer to the platform. Also, the use of classical constructions like factories, are discouraged in these environments. Ideally the programmer would simply write the code the way he likes (or is used to), while the system would produce well-adapted code. Therefore, optimizations of the system (especially memory management) are highly relevant.
The presented analysis supports the main concepts of the Java language and the Java runtime: openness, dynamically loading classes, reflection, etc. Some of these aspects imply security concerns, and we want to be able to load mobile code that benefits from EA in a secure way. Thus, the system must not delegate trust on any other party: it must compute or verify the analysis itself. Since these systems are resource limited, we have to develop efficient computation techniques. We propose an analysis that combines several aspects: it is compositional like the one of [12] , verifiable like the one of [1] , and adapted for object-oriented issues, which is not proposed by any other EA we know about, even if context-sensitive interprocedural analyses have been studied before [4] . This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the problems encountered with classic EA when applied to constraint environments, as well as situations where EA is not as efficient as one would hope (regardless of whether it is embedded or not). Section 2 gives a strong overview of the mechanisms that operate behind the scene. And finally section 3 presents results and comparison between some literature approaches and ours.
Problematics
Existing works on escape analyses are applicable under different conditions and have different goals. For example, the statically analyzed code may be high level source code or a low-level representation. A more important difference is the support for dynamic class loading: most analyses consider a closed-world model, so that the complete call graph of a program can be statically computed, which makes it easier to perform a very precise analysis. On the contrary, some works like [1] consider a fully open world, at the cost of precision. Also, the analysis scheme may be local or distributed: either the execution site has enough resources to perform the analysis on demand, or it needs precomputed results (using for example proof-carrying code [8] ) to keep its power for the real execution.
Statically computing objects properties introduces approximations due to abstract interpretation, which are required to be safe. In the introduction, we presented EA as a convenient optimization for memory management. It follows that it is always safe (though potentially suboptimal) to mark objects as surviving longer than they really do.
The EA marks objects that do not survive (escape) to their creation method, and allows the virtual machine to allocate them in a stack. This technique gives good runtime results and has been studied for a long time. Still, there are some limitations and even common coding style can defeat the EA in frustrating ways.
First, we consider the aggregation mechanism, which is heavily used in the Java standard API, and often leads to situations where some fields of an object are also objects that are allocated in its constructor. More generally, the Java API provides many "container" classes, that is, classes whose role is to aggregate collections of other objects. Those containers include for example the Collection hierarchy, but also the stream and file abstractions, that keep an internal representation that is closer to the system. Typically these internal structures have no reason to be exported outside the container, thus they could be allocated in stack whenever the main object itself is allocated in stack. Anyway, these fields are never stack allocated using traditional EA since they are created in the constructor of the container and are used in other methods. Another popular design pattern makes objects escape: the factories.
Let us consider Figure 1 . The StringBuffer used to compute "name: " + s in the class Student can be captured by the EA and can be stack allocated. One of the fields of the StringBuffer class is an array which is allocated in the constructor. This field could also be stack allocated if it does not escape anywhere else, which cannot be detected by traditional EA. For the same reason, if one created a Student object which does not escape, the Vector created in Student() (and its aggregated array) could also be Figure 1 . Example of use of creational patterns.
stack allocated. The last field of the class Student we have to consider is a. It is somehow created in the same conditions as book list. The difference lies in the creation method: the field a is created by a factory, which is not manageable by traditional EA.
To propose a complete analysis of objects that can be allocated in stack, we have to consider aggregation and factory creational patterns. We propose an extension of traditional EA considering these patterns.
Once computed, the information gathered by the EA must be made available to the execution engine, so that it can use them. Actually, two elements must be transmitted: the information itself and enough data for enabling the system to verify their correctness. In order to achieve this, we rely on a lightweight bytecode verification [10] . This method can be used because it is quite trivial to encode the results of our alias analysis as a finite lattice, thus placing ourselves under the right conditions to apply this algorithm.
The principle of the verification is to run a similar analysis in the embedded system, while avoiding the complexity of the algorithm by keeping verifiable extra information from the off-line analysis.
Definitions and algorithms

Alias analysis
Our goal is to present an EA that needs an underlying general purpose alias analysis. We first present a lightweight and verifiable alias analysis for Java bytecode. This analysis is split in two parts (off-line and on-line) that enable the analysis to be performed by the code producer, while the code consumer only has to verify the integrity of the results.
This alias analysis is similar to what has been proposed in [4, 11] . Still, the particular choices made here play a role in both its meaningfulness in embedded systems (via unavoidable approximations) and its extensibility, so that we can plan to build an extended EA taking creational patterns into account on top of it.
Preliminary and definitions
In the following, O denotes the set of all the objects that can be used in a Java program. When dealing with aliases, our goal is to compute as precisely as possible the image of O by the following relation.
Definition 1 ("Pointed by" relation) Let ֒→ : O → O be the "pointed by" relation. The relation o ֒→ f reads "f is pointed by o" and means that f is a reference contained in a field of o.
Note: to simplify the model, an array is considered as an object with a potentially infinite number of fields, therefore an array also "points to" its elements.
Definition 2 (Reachability) We denote by ֒→ * the transitive closure of ֒→.
Abstraction
To perform a static analysis of a program we need an abstraction of the relation ֒→ that deals with abstract objects instead of objects directly, because one cannot decide statically which real object is used at runtime. The set of used abstract objects is composed of various subsets, described as follows.
Definition 3 (Abstract Objects for a method)
Let m be a method, then the set of abstract objects for m isȎ = P m ∪ {R m } ∪ {E m } ∪ A m ∪ F m ∪ {Static} where:
• P m represents the set {p 0 = this, p 1 , . . .} of object parameters of m,
• R m the return value of m (restricted to objects),
• E m the exceptions to be thrown (they are unified in our abstraction),
• A m the set of allocation sites in m,
• F m the set of function calls returning objects in m,
• and Static an abstraction of the static objects.
An important subset is A m , that represents all the objects that may be created during the method execution. We consider one abstract object for each new bytecode (the same goes for other new-like bytecodes). Therefore we will call r N the abstract object that represents all the objects that are created executing the N th bytecode. The same goes for F m : we call f N the abstract object that corresponds to the objects returned by an invocation at the N th bytecode.
Definition 4 (Object abstraction)
Let o ∈ O and o ∈Ȏ. We note o ∝ȏ ifȏ is an abstraction of o.
Obviously the relations described in Definitions 1 and 2 cannot be statically computed, so that we focus on an abstraction of those relations.
Definition 5 ("Pointed by" relation abstraction)
The abstraction of the "pointed by" relation is its modulo on the domain of abstract objects. It is defined as follows:ȏ Our algorithm aims at computing alias relations that provide a safe basis for more complex analyses (like EA), so that the information we focus on expresses the "links" between abstract objects. A safe and statically computable approximation of α ֒→ * can be found, that deals with the control flow problem. By keeping in our algorithm a link array up to date, we have a way to describe (at a given time, or step in the algorithm) the potential relation between abstract objects (in the sense of the α ֒→ * relation).
Definition 7 (Link array)
A link array is a part of O ×Ȏ. We note Link m the set of link arrays for a method m (Link m is the set of parts ofȎ ×Ȏ).
Definition 8 (Link array correctness) A link array A is said to be correct regarding its context if ∀f, t ∈Ȏ :
Note that there is only a one-way implication between the description stored in the link array and the relation between abstract objects. This is due to necessary approximations in our algorithm.
Algorithm
Our algorithm is divided into two major aspects: the inter-method analysis and the intramethod one. Since we consider an open world, we cannot rely on a complete call-graph for our analysis. Instead, some methods may be loaded a posteriori, which forces us to analyze a piece of code independently of its calling context. We use persistent information to describe the behavior of a method, in order not to be forced to re-analyze its body when it is invoked. A signature is associated to each method, which describes as precisely as possible the links that are created by calling it. The signature is a transformation to be applied over a concrete vector of arguments to obtain an overestimation of the created links without the need to re-analyze the method in a new context. By analyzing the bytecode, we compute a signature associated to each method: this is what we call the exact signature. Obviously, this signature can be applied when we know statically which method is called: this is the case for example with the invokeStatic bytecode. When dealing with invokeVirtual, it is not that trivial: one has to know the exact type of an abstract object to be able to apply the correct signature. For example, after instruction Object o = new String(); the object o is known to be a String, therefore at this point of the program any call to an Object method could be resolved statically, even if an invokeVirtual bytecode is generated. As in [1] , we use exact types when possible, applying an exact signature or an approximate one, depending on the case.
Definition 10 (Exact type) An object (hence an abstract object) is of an exact type if one can statically decide what constructor was used to create the instance. This property is described by the following predicate: exactT ype :Ȏ → bool.
Definition 11 (Signature order) Let s 1 , s 2 ∈ Sign two signatures for the same method.
Note: ⊤ m and ⊥ m are defined by:
The signatures for single method m form a lattice. The most pessimistic signature for this method is ⊤ m , and the most optimistic signature is ⊥ m . With those definitions, we introduce the notion of approximate signature, which is a supremum (obtained by unification) of the exact signatures computed for an inheritance sub-tree. This signature is used when no exact type can be computed statically (for example abstract objects obtained as return values). The structure that fills the gap between the inter-method analysis and the intramethod one is called a dictionary. Its goal is to hold a pair of signatures associated to each method, the exact one and the approximate one.
Definition 12 (Dictionary) Let F unc be the set of Java methods in a program, and Sign be the set of possible signatures. A dictionary is a mapping d : F unc → (Sign × Sign). The algorithm is iterative: starting from the most optimistic signature ⊥ m we analyze the bytecode by following the control flow and applying the previously presented signatures when an invocation is performed. As stated in Definition 9, the signature of the method corresponds to the visible links that are created during the method body.
Each standard Java bytecode is given a semantic to express the transformation applied on the state of links when in is encountered in a program. Most bytecodes are given a trivial (neutral) semantic, since they do not play a role in the links creation process. Table 1 gives the semantic for the main actions. Several operators and notations are used in the semantic rules:
• closure(L) ensures that the link array L remains transitively closed and symmetric,
• π→ p (L) denotes the projection of L on the vector of effective arguments,
• I ⋆ S is the composition operator, that propagates the links of S from the initial situation I,
•v represents the abstract content of the variable v.
The algorithm stops when reaching a fix point for the state of the link array at return points (we note Link r m this link array for a method m). This fix point exists since we apply a monotonic transformation on a finite space, and its projection on the visible links of m gives us the exact signature for the method. Figure 2 that shows a very simple linked-list construction. The bytecode and complete execution of our alias analysis are given in Figure 3 . In our example, the only real link creation occurs with the putfield bytecode, which corresponds to the linkage of a cell (p.link = x).
Example Let us consider the example in
As for the verification part, the information highlighted in Figure 3 are sufficient since the bytecodes at offsets 2 and 28 are the only targets of jumps. It is trivial to see that with this information, the system can check the correctness of the signature by analyzing each bytecode only once. 2.1.5. Approximation An approximation was hidden in the semantic of the putfield bytecode used in Table 1 . There are at least two drawbacks with being as precise in abstract objects aliasing (regarding fields) as works like [2] . First, we want to provide information that are verifiable by small embedded systems, thus avoiding heavy treatments. Second, the dictionary is kept by the system, so it must be as small as possible. Moreover, keeping precise information about fields would prevent inherited methods from creating links to new fields, which would closely bind a semantic to implementation details. Instead of that, we decided to unify all the fields of an object: whenever a field is accessed, we pretend the object itself is accessed. It is a big approximation, but a very convenient one, both in terms of efficiency and simplicity. Similarly, when accessing an object, every field of this object is considered as accessed, for the very same reason, which explains why the closure operator ensures the symmetry. By relaxing constraints on implementations, we gain flexibility. Some other related works like [5] make different choices, remaining very precise with the object fields but losing inter-method precision by performing a flow-insensitive analysis. We obtain a flow-sensitive analysis that is correct while keeping the quantity of information as low as possible.
Escape analysis and extensions
Our analysis focuses on captured objects, and the results are defined as correct if no object statically marked as captured really escapes.
Definition 13 (Captured Object) An object o is said to be captured in the scope of a method m if it is created in m and after the execution of m there exists no more reference to o.
Definition 14 (Operational definition)
The set of captured objects of a method m, C m , is defined by:
In order to enable the analysis to take creational patterns into account we have to consider object creations in constructors and factories. Constructors are easy to detect: they are the <init> methods. Factories are much more difficult to detect. A simple way could be to define naming conventions but this would potentially reduce the number of detected factories, especially in an open world where loaded code comes from anywhere. Thus, we decide to choose a very simple definition: we treat as a factory any method that returns an object that is not attached to anything else. We call such objects fresh objects using the same terminology as [7] . A call to a factory is quite similar as a new bytecode: it returns a newly allocated object. In the example of Figure 1 , objects of class Address may be created using the factory FactAddress. The method createAddress returns a newly allocated object whose reference is not attached to anything and is just returned: this method will be detected as a factory.
We now propose a mechanism to detect the allocations in the constructors of objects and factories, and to be able to perform them in the stack if the base object itself is allocated in the stack. Therefore, it is a conditional stack allocation, which occurs only under conditions computed at runtime. Anyway, we propose a solution which is still based on a static analysis. The main issues to take care about are:
1. We have to determine allocation sites candidate for conditional stack allocation.
2. The order to perform the conditional allocations in stack in constructors or factories will be given by the calling method, so we need an information flow from caller to callee, which is a pure runtime information.
3. We have to consider nested constructors and factories to maximize the number of objects effectively allocated in stack at runtime.
Algorithm
First we have to detect allocation sites that are candidate for conditional allocation.
Definition 15
The set of conditional allocation sites of a method m is defined by:
where α = this if m is an <init> method, and R m otherwise.
Then, we have to detect in each method the places where constructors or factories must perform conditional allocations effectively in stack.
Property 1 Let m be a method. The invokespecial bytecodes only used to construct objects that belongs to C m must be marked as invocation with stack allocation order. The set of allocations by factories that do not escape is defined by: For a method m, the EA algorithm computes the set C m of captured objects. The invokespecial bytecodes used to invoke the constructors of the captured objects must perform conditional allocations in stack. This is true because of the approximation we presented earlier, in Section 2.1.5: whenever a field of an object escapes, then the whole object is considered as escaping. This implies that if an object is marked as captured, then all his fields are "captured" as well, which means that the calling context does not make them escape. Then one must associate each allocation with the corresponding constructor call. This can be done during the analysis by marking for each invokespecial bytecode, on which object it is called.
The last thing we have to consider is the possibility to use nested constructors and factories. For example, in a constructor, one of the fields can be created using a factory: the call to the factory cannot be marked as invocation with stack allocation order since the way the allocations must be performed in the factory depends on the fact that the constructor itself is called with the stack allocation order or not. We have to introduce a last mechanism which allows us to give what is called transmission of stack allocation order. 
Implementation and results
Implementation details and choices
Other structures are needed during the analysis, such as an abstraction of the execution stack. Those structures are needed only for type computation and also to determine the exact moment when the analysis has reached its fix point (which exists because we are considering a monotonically increasing function over a finite space). They do not appear in the semantics briefly described in Table 1 in order to keep things as clear as possible.
The computation of the signature of a method depends from the signatures of all the methods that are invoked from it. When a method f is unknown, we give it the signature ⊥ f when calling it, which is not correct. When f is finally analyzed, the results that depend from its signature are invalidated, requiring a new analysis. It is important to note that the algorithm may associate an incorrect signature to each method until a fix-point is reached. On the other hand, when dealing with a method f that are unknown and will not be analyzed (such as natives), the signature to be applied is ⊤ f . Table 2 . Usual benchmarks analyzed and executed with JITS.
the most important point is that our approximation regarding non-exact types is far less pessimistic. These results only take advantage of "pure" escape analysis, because there is nothing to compare to in the area of the presented extensions, and also because the selected benchmarks are not relevant regarding this (since the design patterns involved are willingly avoided in those).
We propose an implementation of our EA on the Java Virtual Machine JITS which is specifically designed to be usable in a range of environments that includes very small and resource-constrained devices. We made some implementation choices to deal with loop allocations and exceptions:
Some previous works [7, 12] make implementation choices that enables them to allocate as many objects as possible in the pool of local variables for performance reasons. Nevertheless the constraints of the Java runtime environment imposes that the size of one frame in the execution stack has to be statically computable at any point of the program. Obviously that would be false if we were to allocate new objects in the stack within a loop. To avoid such problems, the choice has been made to separate stack allocations from the main execution stack, in order to be able to allocate in the stack in any situation, which turns out to be really valuable at runtime for most benchmarks.
Exceptions in their generality are a big problem for EA. Any object that is somehow attached to an exception should be marked as escaped, since there is no possibility to ensure statically whether an exception is caught in the method or not. We chose to prevent exceptions from making attached objects escape, and to compensate by moving at runtime stack allocated objects into heap if needed for correctness, arguing that exceptions should be exceptional enough for the overhead to be acceptable.
Everything is built on top of our alias analysis. In fact, the extensions presented refine the standard EA by providing static information to be combined at runtime. Each time a method is invoked a new frame is created in the object stack, to hold the objects statically or dynamically marked as captured. When the method returns, the statically marked objects can be destroyed, while the dynamically marked ones have to be integrated into the calling frame (since they survive the method) to be destroyed with their "container".
For this purpose, we have modified the descriptor of the frame (or context) that is created for each method invocation, by adding a flag to it. When the flag is true, then the conditional stack allocations that occur during the execution of the method can be performed in stack, and in the heap otherwise.
Transformations of the code
Mostly for clarity and semantic simplicity, we have decided to represent the exploitation of the analysis with new bytecodes. Since those bytecodes only exist from the loading of the code, they have no real existence, and can be as well compiled as native code in the system. The information given by our extended EA is exploited by our JVM in the following way.
• new and its variants are replaced by newstack,. . . when they are marked as captured by the EA. They perform the allocation in the stack,
• new and its variants are replaced by newif,. . . when they are marked as conditional stack allocation. They perform the allocation in stack when the flag of the current frame is true, in heap otherwise, Figure 4 . Maze Game example.
• invokespecial, invokevirtual, invokestatic, and invokeinterface are replaced by the bytecodes invokespecialTrue,. . . when they are marked as invocation with stack allocation order. They have the same semantics except that they set the flag to true in the new frame when the original one set it to false,
• the invocation bytecodes are replaced by invokespecialCopy, . . . when they are marked as invocation with propagation of the stack allocation order. They have the same semantics that the original bytecodes except that they copy the current frame flag value in the new frame.
Extended escape analysis example
To illustrate our contribution regarding factories (or more generally creational patterns) we chose something that is more representative of this pattern. The book "Design Patterns" [6] presents the factory pattern with a simple example (originally in C++) that creates mazes by using factories. In particular, CreateMaze (see Figure 4) is the starting point for the creation of a complex Maze and performs many calls to factories. The EA would mark all the objects created in the factories as escaping. Our analysis, however, marks them as stack allocatable under some conditions. For example, with the Main class, the entire Maze is allocated in stack, including all its components. In the general case, we have no guaranty that any object marked as conditionally stack allocatable will actually fill the conditions, but this information can only be a benefit, since it comes in addition to standard EA (it cannot lead to a decreasing number of stack allocations).
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a modular and verifiable EA, based on an alias analysis, and well suited for use in resource limited embedded systems. This EA is sound and takes into account the entire Java language, including dynamic class loading, since it does not require the whole call graph.
In addition, we have presented two extensions of the EA that intend to treat fairly common design patterns (aggregation and factories), that traditionally defeat EA. The goal of those extensions is to enable the system to use more efficiently code that is not written specifically for embedded systems, and thus makes use of those patterns, which are usually considered bad practice in constrained environments, due to a high cost.
The underlying alias analysis makes the entire analysis verifiable, since all the computation needed can be performed at a low cost in the embedded system.
